. As we said, a probability based strategy is
using decisions made as result of evaluating the probability figures. These are
decisions such as making a particular playing decision at a certain moment of
the game and also of choosing a certain game to begin with.
Probability Theory is the only rigorous theory that models the hazard. But it
only offers measurements of this hazard and not certainties about punctual
events. The certainty offered by the "Law of Large Numbers" (see page 35 of my
book) is one of the limit, approximation and existence type. This theorem does
not provide precise information about occurrence of expected events (for
example, it cannot tell how many times we have to throw a die to surely get a
5), but even the limit behavior gives additional information.
The basic element of probability based strategy is choosing the gaming
variant that offers the highest probability of occurrence of expected event, in
condition of identical ulterior advantages. Assume that the player has reached a
decision situation, at a certain game. His or her options are the gaming
variants A and B, both providing the same ulterior advantages, in case of
occurrence of expected event.
Why is it good for the player to choose the gaming variant that offers the
higher probability of expected event, as long as Probability Theory does not
provide him or her any certainty about it? If we answer this question, the
choice of probability based strategy as being optimal will be justified.
Let's denote by P(A) the probability of occurrence of expected event in
experiment A (playing variant A) and by P(B) the probability of occurrence of
expected event in experiment B (playing variant B) and assume that P(A)>
P(B). We will first provide a motivation for choosing the gaming variant A, in
case the gambler is a regular player of this game.
Let's come back to the "Law of Large Numbers". This theorem states that, in a
sequence of independent experiments, the relative frequency of occurrence of a
certain event is converging towards the probability of that event.
Let's consider experiment A as being part of a sequence of experiments,
namely the sequence of experiments of playing variant A by the same gambler, at
the same type of game, every time he or she reaches that respective situation
(in ulterior games).
Similarly, let's consider experiment B as being part of the sequence of
analogue experiments where the gambler chooses variant B (hypothetically). Let's
denote by a(n) the number of occurrences of expected event after n experiments
of A type and by b(n) the number of occurrences of expected event after n
experiments of B type.
We will show that a sufficiently big number N exists, such that a(n) >
b(n), for any n > N. The demonstration is obvious: We assume the opposite,
namely that for any N, exists n > N such that a(n) < b(n) or a(n) = b(n).
In the same conditions, results a(n)/n < b(n)/n or a(n)/n = b(n)/n. By
passing to the limit in this inequality and using the law of large numbers
(a(n)/n à P(A), b(n)/n à
P(B)), we get that P(A) < P(B) or P(A) = P(B) and that is false (we initially
assumed that P(A) > P(B)). Therefore, a(n) > b(n) from a certain rank
upward, within the sequence of experiments. This means that the number of
favorable events will be bigger (cumulatively) in case of sequence of
experiments of A type, from a certain rank upward.
Although no mathematical result establishes which this number N is (we only
know it exists), the above demonstration is offering a motivation (purely
theoretical) for choosing the gaming variant A, namely the following: "We know
there is a level N from which the cumulative number of favorable events is
bigger in the situation of a sequence of experiments of A type. If we "alter"
this sequence by introducing experiments of B type, the fulfillment of the N
experiments will be delayed."
This is the only theoretical motivation that uses probability properties.
Because we do not have information about N, which can be any size and eventually
never reached, the motivation remains a theoretical one and might have no
practical coverage, except the cases in which the difference P(A) - P(B) is
significant.
Despite all these, it remains a motivation that justifies the choice of
probability based strategy. But how do we justify the choice of probability
based strategy in a situation where the gambler is not a regular player of the
particular game, he or she plays it only once so the time tendency is not a
motivation any more?
We have here a punctual gaming situation, in which the gambler has to make a
decision to choose one of variants A and B, in a condition of identical ulterior
advantages. Why should he or she choose variant A, which offers a higher
probability for the expected event?
(A similar situation, not apparently related to gambling, is the following:)
>
You are in a phone box and you must urgently communicate important
information to one of your neighbors. (Let's say you left your front door open).
You have only one coin, so you can make one single call.
You have two neighboring houses.
Two persons are living in one of them and three persons are living in the
other.
Both their telephones have answering machines.
Which one of the two numbers will you call? Isn't it true that you "feel"
that you must choose the house with 3 persons, because the probability for
someone to be at home is higher? But how do we rigorously explain this optimal
choice, based on probability criteria? Coming back to the assumed gaming
situation, the "Law of Large Numbers" will still provide us a theoretical
motivation for the choice.
Although we don't have here a sequence of tangible experiments, not even
expected ones (as in the regular player case) to include respective experiment,
we still can introduce it in such a sequence, so as for application of the "Law
of Large Numbers" to be available.
Let's consider the sequence of independent experiments of all experiments of
A type performed in time by other players, in the same gaming situation,
chronologically, until the respective gaming moment. Similarly, let's consider
the sequence of experiments of B type, chronologically performed until the
respective moment.
For the two previously defined sequences of experiments we can do the same
deduction as in the first case (regular player), based on the law of large
numbers, and the result will be: a sufficiently big number N of experiments
exists, such that for any n > N, we have a(n) > b(n) or a(n) = b(n).
Therefore, the motivation of "not altering" the sequence of experiments of A
type still stands valid, even if only at the theoretic level.
So, the answer to the question generated by the your required choice is the
following: "Although we don't know where the rank N (provided by the law of
large numbers) is standing and also if experiment A offers a favorable result,
it is proper to choose the gaming variant A at least for the reason of other
eventual ulterior similar gaming situations to form an "unaltered" sequence of
experiments of A type."
As we said, the motivation is a purely theoretical one, but it accomplishes
the proposed goal, namely to show that the probability based strategy is
optimal. The above presented situation of an isolated game has a much smaller
practical coverage than in the case of a regular player, except the cases in
which the difference P(A) - P(B) is big
, a superior position in
the game, or other strategic advantages.
A probability based strategy can be seen as optimal only after taking into
account the player's goals and these could be various. Thus, the probability
criteria do not always determine decisions, but also the personal and subjective
criteria of the player.
As is well known, probabilities do not provide certainties about hazard. The
probability based strategy is optimal, but it still does not guarantee winning.
In other words, such a strategy is the optimum strategy to adopt when trying to
"push your luck", but it does not bring you luck made to order.
Although the probability of getting 1 after one die throw is 1/6, if we throw
the die 6 times, this does not assure us getting a 1, just as throwing the die
10 times does not assure it. Theoretically, is possible to throw the die 1,000
times and not get a single 1, although it is improbable. The only thing we know
for sure is that the frequency of occurrences of 1 is getting closer to 1/6, as
the number of throws increases.
There is an obvious difference between the terms "possible" and "probable".
Probability is a measure, mathematically rigorously defined, whereas "possible"
is a much more complex and difficult to define philosophical category.
Probability is modeling a minute part of the possible.
A hypothetical rigorous definition of "possible" should include another "zero
degree" philosophical term, namely the reality. This dimension difference
between the two terms is the most relevant expression of the fact that we cannot
rule over the hazard, but we can "push our luck" by using the laws of
probability, even if this often results in losses.
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